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Origins of the Human Genome Project
Robert Mulan Cook-Deegan*
Introduction
The earliest and most obvious applications of genome research are
tests for genetic disorders, but less obvious diagnostic uses may prove at
least as important, such as forensic uses to establish identity (to
determine paternity, to link suspects of physical evidence of rape or
murder, or as a molecular "dog-tag" in the military). Genome research
also promises to find genes expeditiously, making the genetic approach
attractive as a first step in the study not only of complex diseases, but
also of normal biological function. Each new gene is a potential target
for drug development - to fix it when broken, to shut it down, to
attenuate or amplify its expression, or to change its product, usually a
protein. Finding a gene gives investigators a molecular handle on
problems that have proven intractable.
Faith that the systematic analysis of DNA structure will prove to be
a powerful research tool underlies the rationale behind the genome
project. Faith that that scientific power will translate to products, jobs
and wealth underlies the recent substantial investments in private
genome research startup companies and the diversification of
pharmaceutical and agricultural research firms into genome research.
The human genome project was borne of technology, grew into a
science bureaucracy in the U.S. and throughout the world and is now
being transformed into a hybrid academic and commercial enterprise.
The next phase of the project promises to veer more sharply toward
commercial application, exploiting the rapidly growing body of
knowledge about DNA structure to the pursuit of practical benefits.
* Dr. Cook-Deegan is the Director, Division of Biobehavioral Sciences and Mental
Disorders, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences. He received his B.A.
(Chemistry) from Harvard College and his M.D. from the University of Colorado.
See also, his book, The Gene Wars: Science, Politics, and the Human Genome
(1994).
5 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 97 [Spring 1994]
The notion that most genetic information is embedded in the
sequence of DNA base pairs comprising chromosomes is a central tenet
of modern genetics. A rough analogy is to liken an organism's genetic
code to computer code. The goal of the genome project, in this
parlance, is to identify and catalog the 75,000 or more files (genes) in
the software that direct construction of a self-modifying and self-
replicating system - a living organism. The main scientific justification
for the genome project is not that it will explain all of biology. By the
software analogy, studying the structure of DNA cannot directly
approach problems of hardware - cells and organs - or of networks
- social and environmental interactions. Biology has from its inception
made clear the importance of adaptability. The complexity of the brain
and its connections, with tens of billions of cells and trillions of
connections, or the immense adaptability of the immune system,
responding to countless external threats (including infectious
organisms) and internal disruptions (including cancer), make clear that
the human body is more than the simple expression of tens of
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of genes. But genes are
important and the direct study of DNA is emerging as the quickest
route to discovering genes, understanding their actions and interactions
and harnessing their power to practical uses.
The genome project is premised on the claim that genetic maps and
new technologies will be among the most useful scientific approaches to
highly complex biological phenomena, not that these maps will be the
end of biology. The genome project is a biological infrastructure
initiative, deriving from the fact that the many investigators using
genetic approaches to explore the biological wilderness need to start
building some roads and bridges. The study of DNA structure
unapologetically promises reductionist explanations of some biological
phenomena, tracing the causes of disease, for example, to mutations in
identified genes - that is, identifiable changes in DNA structure that
affect biological function. This should not be confused, however, with a
simplistic genetic determinism, with all its historical and political
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baggage. Indeed, the study of a wider variety of genes, diseases and
biological functions will surely dispel the simple-minded renditions of
gene function, overwhelming it with myriad concrete examples of
biological complexity that defy explanation by linear causal chains.
Genes will nonetheless be nodes in most of the causal networks
associated with interesting biological phenomena and determining
DNA structure is one of the surest and fastest ways to probe those
networks. Gene maps are essential to this process; the genome project is
aimed at providing those maps.
Science administrators and members of Congress who shepherded
the budgets for genome research (and their counterparts in other
nations and international organizations) supported the project not only
because of its medical benefits, but also because they saw it as a vehicle
for technological advance and creation of jobs and wealth. The main
policy rationale for genome research was the pursuit of gene maps as
scientific tools to conquer disease, but economic development was an
explicit, if subsidiary, goal.
The genome project results from the confluence of tributaries that
course through many provinces. The technical conception of the
genome project derives mainly from precedents in molecular biology,
but the story contains other major elements - the advance and
dissemination of information technology, restructuring of the science
bureaucracy and increasing participation by commercial organizations.
One way to trace these origins is to recount phases in the development
of the genome project: how it got started, how it was redefined and
how it is now progressing. The history can be roughly divided into four
stages: origins of the idea for a human genome project (the genesis),
redefinition of its goals (a period of ideological conflict never
completely resolved), emergence into a bureaucracy in the U.S. and
several other nations (the Watson era) and transformation into a
government-industry enterprise (still in progress).
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Origins of the Idea
The genome project now embraces three main technical goals:
genetic linkage maps to trace the inheritance of chromosome regions
through pedigrees; physical maps of large chromosome regions, to
enable the direct study of DNA structure in search of genes; and
substantial DNA sequence information, enabling the correlation of
DNA changes with alterations in biological function. If history were
logical, then the genome project would have grown from a discussion of
each in turn and how to bring them together into a coherent plan.
History is not logical, however, and it was DNA sequencing technology
rather than genetic linkage mapping that gave rise to the idea of a
human genome project.
Three individuals independently proposed publicly to sequence the
entire human genome, that is, deriving the order of DNA bases
comprising all human chromosomes. Actually, this will, like other
biological maps, be a composite or reference genome, as there is
considerable variation among individuals. While the order of genes and
chromosome segments is generally quite stable, it is individual
variations that are often of greatest interest. Gene maps help by laying
out the overall structure, while much interesting biology comes from
understanding how variations come about and what they cause.
The seminal technology that led to the genome project was a group
of techniques for determining the sequence of base pairs in DNA. In
1954, just a year after Watson and Crick described the double helical
structure of DNA, George Gamow speculated that DNA sequence was
a four-letter code embedded in the order of base pairs.1 In 1975,
Fredrick Sanger announced to a stunned audience that he had
developed a way to determine the order of those base pairs efficiendy. 2
1 George Gamow, Possible Relation between Deoxyribonucleic Acid and Protein
Structures, 173 Nature 318 (1954). (I thank Maynard Olson for pointing out this
reference.)
2 Frederick Sanger, The Croonian Lecture, 1975: Nucleotide Sequences in DNA,
B191 Proc. Royal Soc. London 317 (1975); Frederick Sanger & Alan R. Coulson,
Rapid Method for Determining Sequences in DNA by Primed Synthesis with
DNA-Polymerase, 94 J. Molec. Biol. 441 (1975) and Frederick Sanger, S. Nilken &
Alan R. Coulson, DNA Sequencing with Chain-Terminating Inhibitors, 74 Proc.
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Alan Maxam and Walter Gilbert at Harvard independently developed
a completely different method that same year. This method was
announced to molecular geneticists late in the summer of 1975 at
scientific conferences and circulated as recipes among molecular
geneticists until formal publication in 1977.3 Half a decade later, many
groups began successfully to automate the process, in North America,
Europe and Japan. The first practical prototype was produced by a
team at the California Institute of Technology in 1986, under the
direction of Lloyd Smith, as part of a large team under Leroy Hood.4
This prototype was quickly converted to a commercial instrument by
Applied Biosystems, Inc., and reached the market in 1987.
The new technologies for DNA sequencing spread through the
biomedical research community like wildfire. By 1978, it was becoming
apparent that sequence information needed to be catalogued
systematically to make it useful to the scientific community. The idea
of a database to contain this information emerged as a priority from a
meeting at Rockefeller University that year. After several years of often
intense and acrimonious discussion, twin databases were established
under the European Molecular Biology Laboratory in Heidelberg and
as GenBank at Los Alamos National Laboratory.5 These databases were
established just as personal computers were beginning to prove their
immense power in biology laboratories. The explosion of
minicomputers in the 1970's and microcomputers in the 1980's fueled
the attention to DNA sequence information because computational
methods were obviously the only way to analyze the deluge of DNA
sequence information produced by sequencing techniques. 6 The
Nat. Acad. Sciences (USA) 5463 (1977).
3 Allan M. Maxam & Walter Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sciences (USA) 560 (1977).
4 Lloyd M. Smith et al., Fluorescence Detection in Automated DNA Sequence
Analysis, 321 Nature 674 (1986).
5 Temple F. Smith, The History of the Genetic Sequence Databases, 6 Genomics
701 (1990).
6 M. J. Bishop & C. J. Rawlings, Nudeic Acid and Protein Sequence Analysis: A
Practical Approach (1987); Michael S. Waterman, Mathematical Methods for DNA
Sequences (1989); Smith, supra note 5; and Michael S. Waterman, Genomic
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technologies were thus present, but it took the spark of an idea of using
them as part of a large organized effort to ignite the fire, out of which
rose the human genome project.
Robert Sinsheimer, then Chancellor of the University of California,
Santa Cruz (UCSC), thought about sequencing the human genome as
the core of a fund-raising opportunity in late 1984. He and others
convened a group of eminent scientists to discuss the idea in May
1985.7 This workshop planted the idea, although it did not succeed in
attracting money for a genome research institute on the campus of
UCSC. Without knowing about the Santa Cruz workshop, Renato
Dulbecco of the Salk Institute conceived of sequencing the genome as a
tool to understand the genetic origins of cancer. Dulbecco, a Nobel
Prize winning molecular biologist, laid out his ideas on Columbus Day,
1985, and subsequently in other public lectures and in a commentary
for Science. 8 The commentary, published in March 1986, was the first
widely public exposure of the idea and gave impetus to the idea's third
independent origin, by then already gathering steam.
Charles DeLisi, who did not initially know about either the Santa
Cruz workshop or Dulbecco's public lectures, conceived of a concerted
effort to sequence the human genome under the aegis of the
Department of Energy (DOE). DeLisi had worked on mathematical
biology at the National Cancer Institute, the largest component of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH). How to interpret DNA sequences
was one of the problems he had studied, working with the T-10 group
at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico (a group of
mathematicians and others interested in applying mathematics and
computational techniques to biological questions). In 1985, DeLisi took
the reins of DOE's Office of Health and Environmental Research, the
Sequence Databases, 6 Genomics 700 (1990).
7 Robert Sinsheimer, The Santa Cruz Workshop, May 1985, 5 Genomics 954
(1989).
8 Renato Dulbecco, A Turning Point in Cancer Research: Sequencing the Human
Genome, 231 Science 1055 (1986) and Renato Dulbecco, A Turning Point in
Cancer Research: Sequencing the Human Genome in Viruses and Human Cancer 1
(Alan R. Liss ed. 1987).
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program that supported most biology in the Department. The origins
of DOE's biology program traced to the Manhattan Project, the World
War II program that produced the first atomic bombs with its concern
about how radiation caused genetic damage.
In the fall of 1985, DeLisi was reading a draft government report
on technologies to detect inherited mutations, a nagging problem in the
study of children to those exposed to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
bombs, when he came up with the idea of a concerted program to
sequence the human genome. 9 DeLisi was positioned to translate his
idea into money and staff. While his was the third public airing of the
idea, it was DeLisi's conception and his station in government science
administration that launched the genome project.
Redefining the Technical Goals
Molecular biologists did not welcome the idea with open arms.
While many, especially those who studied medical genetics and the
inheritance of genetic diseases, were enthusiastic, the broader
community of protein biochemists and even molecular geneticists were
far more skeptical. The year 1986 was a time of setback and
redefinition for the genome project. The nadir of the project's
trajectory came at a meeting at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in June
1986. A rump session was called to discuss Dulbecco's editorial. Walter
Gilbert, who had been infected with the Santa Cruz bug, laid out a
rationale for the project and then began to describe its technical goals
and price tag. The discussion quickly veered into the politics of
biomedical research - the dangers that large projects posed for
budgets to support small investigator-initiated research (the space
shuttle served as the negative icon) and the questionable competence of
DOE to run such a project. David Smith, as the DOE representative,
faced a largely hostile audience, although he also got many private
expressions of support.
The controversy provoked several events on the policy front, and
the debate moved to Washington, DC. The Howard Hughes Medical
9 Charles DeLisi, The Human Genome Project, 76 Am. Scientist 488 (1988).
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Institute, which had begun to get interested in the genome project, held
a well-attended international forum in July 1986. In October, NIH
hosted a discussion in conjunction with a meeting of its Director's
Advisory Committee. These two meetings exposed considerable rancor
among the ranks of prominent molecular biologists, but they also began
the search for common ground and laid the groundwork for a two-year
succession of countless meetings that redefined the human genome
project. The redefinition took place most conspicuously in a committee
of the National Research Council (NRC).
In September 1986, two projects were initiated to study the idea.
The NRC, the largest operational arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, approved a study. The NRC appointed a committee of
prestigious researchers chaired by Bruce Alberts of the University of
California at San Francisco. This study committee vigorously debated
the merits of a concerted scientific program, carrying out in microcosm
the debate transpiring more broadly in the scientific community.
The NRC committee took a commonsense approach, looking at
the scientific and technical steps that would be necessary to construct
comprehensive maps of the human genome and to make sense of the
resulting information. They started by bringing together those
constructing various kinds of genetic maps in different organisms. The
idea of a human genetic linkage map grew out of work in viruses,
bacteria, yeast and other organisms. The key insight grew from a 1978
inspiration shared between David Botstein, then at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and Ronald Davis of Stanford. In a discussion
at Alta, Utah, they speculated that researchers could find natural DNA
differences among individuals in families, most of which would not
necessarily lead to clinically detected differences, to trace the
inheritance of chromosome regions through those families.
Each person has a pair of each of the 22 non-sex chromosomes. 10
Botstein and Davis suggested that if detectable differences could be
found for discrete chromosome regions, then one could figure out
which of each parent's chromosome pair was inherited by each child. A
10 Women have an additional pair of X chromosomes, while men have an X and a Y.
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map of such differences would enable geneticists to determine the
approximate location of disease-associated and other genes, even if they
had no prior clues about the gene's function. 11 By late 1979, the first
such DNA marker was found by Arlene Wyman and Raymond White,
working in Worcester, Massachusetts. 12
These heterogeneous DNA markers were quickly used to hunt for
disease genes, demonstrating the utility gene mapping. Suppose, for
example, that some children of a mother (or father) with Huntington's
disease also developed it as adults, while others did not. If the affected
children all inherited DNA from the same region of chromosome 4,
while those unaffected inherited the other copy of that DNA, this
would be strong statistical evidence that DNA in that chromosome 4
region contained the Huntington's disease. This is exactly what James
Gusella and others discovered in 1983, when they linked Huntington's
disease to the tip of chromosome 4.13 The DNA marker they used to
track the passage of chromosome 4 in families was not the gene itself,
but a nearby region that just happened to differ among family
members so that the investigators could tell the chromosomes apart.
Finding the gene itself took another decade of arduous work, but it was
ultimately successful, made possible only because genetic linkage
narrowed the zone of DNA to scan for the offending mutation.14
The second cluster of mapping techniques centered on structural
catalogs of DNA fragments, rather than markers to track inheritance
through pedigrees. The- general idea was to take native chromosomal
DNA, break it into fragments that could be copied by various cloning
techniques and put the DNA fragments, plehtiful enough to study in
the laboratory, back in order. If this could be done for all the
11 David Botstein et al., Construction of a Genetic Linkage Map in Man Using
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 32 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 314 (1980).
12 Arlene R.Wyman & Ray L. White, A Highly Polymorphic Locus in Human
DNA, 77 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sciences (USA) 6754 (1980).
13 J. F. Gusella et al., A Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to
Huntington's Disease, 306 Nature 234 (1983).
14 R. G. Snell et al., Relationship between Trinucleotide Repeat Expansion and
Phenotypic Variation in Huntington's Disease, 4 Nat. Genet. 329 (1993).
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chromosomes, once a gene's location were narrowed by genetic linkage,
then the DNA from that region would already be be stored in a freezer
somewhere, catalogued and ready for direct analysis.
The techniques for physical mapping were again derived from work
on viruses and bacteria, and, by the mid-1980's, pioneering groups had
moved into constructing physical maps of larger and more complex
organisms. Maynard Olson and his colleagues at Washington
University were working on a physical map of yeast, which was a very
powerful model for the genetics of organisms with nucleated cells. 15 In
Cambridge, U.K., Alan Coulson, John Sulston and their colleagues
were working on a physical map of the nematode, Caenorhabditis
elegans.16 C. elegans had been identified by Sydney Brenner as a
powerful model to apply genetic techniques to study development and
behavior of organisms containing differentiated organs, including a
primitive nervous system. 17 John Sulston had mapped the lineage of
every cell in the body of one developmental stage, 1 8 and others at
Cambridge had traced the connections of the entire nervous system. 19
While the entire genomes of yeast and nematode were only the size of a
singe human chromosome, many believed that similar techniques
would prove applicable for the entire human genome, more than an
order of magnitude larger. The prospects for physical mapping
brightened in 1987, when David Burke and Georges Carle, working
with Maynard Olson, developed a technique to clone DNA fragments
hundreds of thousands of base pairs in length, considerably reducing
the complexity of constructing large-scale physical maps.2 0
15 Maynard V. Olson et al., Random-Clone Strategy for Genomic Restriction
Mapping in Yeast, 83 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sciences (USA) 7826 (1986).
16 Alan Coulson et al., Toward a Physical Map of the Genome of the Nematode
Caenorhabditis elegans, 83 Proc. Nat. Acad. Sciences (USA) 7821 (1986).
17 Sydney Brenner, Genetics of Behavior, 29 British Med. Bull. 269(1973).
18 John E. Sulston &I H. Robert Horvitz, Post-Embryonic Cell Lineages of the
Nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, 56 Dev. Biol. 110 (1977); John E. Sulston,
Neuronal Cell Lineages in the Nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, 48 Cold Spring
Harbor Symp. Quant. Biol. 443 (1983) and John E. Sulston et al., The Embryonic
Cell Lineage of the Nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, 100 Dev. Biol. 64 (1983).
19 John G. White et al., The Structure of the Nervous System of the Nematode
Caenorhabditis elegans, B314 Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. London 1 (1986).
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The NRC committee ultimately redefined the project to embrace
the entire set of genetic maps, giving much greater prominence to
genetic linkage mapping and physical mapping than to sequencing. It
also underscored the importance of organisms other than the human. 2 1
The committee recommended an annual budget of $200 million for 15
years, supporting the budget recommendations of a previous DOE
advisory committee. 2 2 The budget recommendations of the two
reports were quite similar, but where the DOE advisors urged DOE to
take the lead, the NRC committee recommended only that there be a
lead agency and proffered NIH, DOE and NSF as options.
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) project on the
human genome initiative was approved in the same hour of the same
day as the NRC study. While the NRC committee crafted a scientific
strategy and made specific recommendations, the OTA report focused
more on policy (why Congress should or should not support it). OTA
surveyed international activity and dwelt far more on issues of
technology transfer, ethical and social implications of genome research,
and research management. 23 OTA's only substantive difference with
the NRC report centered on the notion of a "lead agency." OTA
warned that if a lead agency meant control of all funding, then picking
one would invite internecine warfare between NIH and DOE, the most
likely result of which would be death of the project. OTA did not offer
specific recommendations, but in congressional testimony, it clearly
favored a truly collaborative effort worked out between the two
agencies, with a congressionally mandated task force as the backup
option if the agencies failed to produce an acceptable agreement.24
20 David T. Burke, Georges F. Carle & M. V. Olson, Cloning of Large Segments
of of Exogenous DNA into Yeast Artificial-Chromosome Vectors, 236 Science 806
(1987).
21 National Research Council, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome
(1988).
22 Health and Environmental Research Advisory Committee (U.S. Dept.Energy),
Report on the Human Genome Initiative (1987).
23 Office of Technology Assessment, Mapping Our Genes-Genome Projects: How
Big? How Fast? (1988); reprinted Johns Hopkins University Press.
24 Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment and
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The genome project rose like the Phoenix from the ashes of Cold
Spring Harbor. A vigorous two-year debate culminated in a pair of
reports that smiled on, indeed pointed out the inevitability of,
systematic gene mapping on the scale of the entire human genome. The
next step was to translate the scientific strategy into a funded set of
coordinated programs.
Establishing Government Programs with Process Goals
The first move toward a genome bureaucracy came in the fiscal year
1987 DOE budget. DeLisi set aside $5.5 million of discretionary funds
already appropriated, reprogramming them for his newly conceived
genome research program. The first congressional action came with the
fiscal year 1988 budgets, during hearings in the Spring and summer of
1987. DeLisi cleared a several-year program of genome research
funding through the Department and then with the White House
Office of Management and Budget. This was incorporated into the
President's budget and duly appropriated, with earmarked spending
authority beginning in October 1987. On the NIH side, no request for
genome research funding went into the President's budget request, but
in response to questions from the House Appropriations subcommittee,
James B. Wyngaarden, Director of NIH, indicated that it could use
$30 million for gene mapping if Congress chose to appropriate $500
million or more than the President had requested. Nobel laureates
James D. Watson and David Baltimore met with Members and staff
from both House and Senate Appropriations Committees in May 1987,
primarily to seek additional funding for AIDS research, but Watson
also asked for $30 million in genome research funds. The House duly
earmarked $30 million, but the Senate only earmarked $6 million, and
a compromise between the houses split the difference.
The genome project was thus established by congressional action at
both NIH and DOE, beginning with the 1988 budget. DOE had long
Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of House Comm. on Science, Space
and Technology, Coordination of Genome Projects in Comm. Report on H.R. 4502
and S. 1966, the Biotechnology Competitiveness Act (Comm. Print 138, 1988).
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before established a genome program office; in October 1988,
Wyngaarden appointed Watson as Associate Director at NIH, in
charge of genome research coordination. The newly appropriated funds
were to be spent through the National Institute of General Medical
Sciences in fiscal years 1988 and 1989, but Watson's office was to
coordinate these funds with over $300 million being spent on genome
research throughout NIH. In October 1989, the Department of Health
and Human Services established the National Center for Human
Genome Research at NIH, giving it authority to spend research funds
directly, beginning with the 1990 fiscal year, rather than channel them
through the National Institute of General Medical Sciences.
The National Science Foundation had a major instrumentation
program, substantial interests in plant and animal genome research and
considerable strength in computational biology, but it did not earmark
funds or create a new management structure.
U.S. Genome Research Budgets at NIH and DOE2 5
Fiscal Year DOE NIH








Outside the U.S., an Italian genome program began in May 1987,
tracing its roots to Renato Dulbecco's talk for the Italian Embassy in
Washington, DC on Columbus Day 1985.26 In the USSR, Alexander
25 Based on budget documents prepared for the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees 1987-1993, and projections by the DOE and National Center for
Human Genome Research.
As noted above, the first year's funding at DOE came from funds that Charles
DeLisi reprogrammed from research budgets within the Department, and did not
require congressional action. The first congressionally earmarked funding for both
NIH and DOE came in fiscal year 1988.
26 Renato Dulbecco, The Italian Genome Program, 7 Genomics 294 (1990).
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Bayev and Andrei Mirzabekov presented the idea for a genome
program to government officials in December 1987, secured support
for a new program after Bayev addressed the General Assembly of the
USSR Academy of Sciences in March 1988 and subsequently obtained
approval from the Council of Ministers in December.2 7 When the
USSR dissolved, the genome project survived as a component of the
Russian science program, one of the few biology programs to actually
carry on research despite the extremely tight resource constraints.
Special genome efforts also took root in the U.K., 2 8 the European
Community (EC),2 9 Japan,3 0 France31 and Canada, 32 in addition to
other European augmentation of human genetics research. 3 3 Latin
American scientists formed a regional network to encourage
collaboration on genome research with laboratories in North America
27 Alexander A. Bayev, The Human Genome, A General Overview (Genom
Cheloveka, Obshchii Uzgliud) (Scientific Council, State Scientific-Technical Program
"Human Genome" Moscow 1989); Alexander A. Bayev, The Human Genome
Project in the USSR, 1 Biomed. Sci. 106 (1990).
28 John Alwen, United Kingdom Genome Mapping Project: Background,
Development, Components, Coordination and Management, and International
Links of the Project, 6 Genomics 386 (1990); Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith,
Euro App roach to the Human Gene Project, 5 FASEB J. 61 (1991); Diane J.
McLaren, The Human Genome - UK and International Research Initiatives in
MRC Annual Report, April 1990-March 1991 44 (Med. Resh. Council, U.K. 1991)
and MRC Annual Report, April 1990-March 1991 (Med. Resh. Council, U.K. 1991).
29 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision
Adopting a Specific Research Programme in the Field of Health: Predictive Medicine:
Human Genome Analysis (1989-1991) (1988); Commission of the European
Communities, Modified Proposal for a Council Decision, Adopting a Specific
Research and Technological Development Programme in the Field of Health -
Human Genome Analysis (1990-1991) (1989); Academia Europaea, Research on the
Human Genome in Europe and Its Relation to Activities Elsewhere in the World
(1991) and Diane J. McLaren, Human Genome Research: A Review of European and
International Contributions (Med. Resh. Council, U.K. 1991).
30 Yoji Ikawa, Human Genome Efforts in Japan, 5 FASEB J. 66 (1991).
31 Bertrand R. Jordan, The French Human Genome Program, 9 Genomics 562
(1991).
32 Advisory Committee on the Human Genome, A Genome Program in Canada
(1992) (Summary of committee recommendations prepared for Canadian Cabinet by
Charles Scriver) and David Spurgeon, Canada Commits Money for Human Genome
Research, 357 Nature 428 (1992).
33 Academia Europaea and McLaren, supra note 29.
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and Europe and among themselves, 34 and UNESCO started a genome
coordination program.3 5 The Human Genome Organization was
founded to coordinate all this work among scientists throughout the
world. 36 The genome project thus grew rapidly into an international
effort supported by many governments and the EC. There was strong
consensus on the need for complete genetic linkage and physical maps,
and general agreement about the need for new sequencing technologies.
There was disagreement, however, about the degree to which large-scale
DNA sequencing should be initiated and outright controversy about
the best scientific strategy to pursue in large-scale sequencing efforts.
As the genome project .was transformed from a series of meetings
and policy reports into an actual scientific program, it added several
process goals to its existing list of major technical goals. One distinctive
aspect of the genome project was its explicit attention to technology
development in addition to science. Attaining the technical goals
depended on new technologies, and developing new biological
methods, instruments, automata and robots, as well as other new
technologies became an explicit objective.
An unprecedented commitment to support research on social, legal
and ethical implications of genome research became the second process
goal. Discussion about the social implications of human genetics had
attended the genome debate from its earliest phases in Washington,
and the history of eugenics cast a long shadow over the genome debate,
particularly in German-speaking Europe. Both the NRC and OTA
reports explicitly acknowledged the importance of social and ethical
issues - and the need to address them head-on as the genome project
progressed. The conference resulting in these papers was itself a product
of that program, being funded partially by the DOE.
34 Jorge E. Allende, Background on the Human Genome Project (Red
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Biologicas 1988); Jorge E.Allende, A View from the
South, 5 FASEB J. 6 (1991).
35 Santiago Grisolia, UNESCO Program for the Human Genome Project, 9
Genomics 404 (1991).
36 Victor A. McKusick, The Human Genome Organization: History, Purposes,
and Membership, 5 Genomics 385 (1989).
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Ensuring that the fruits of genome research were quickly translated
into useful applications (and thence into jobs and wealth) became
another process goal for the human genome project. Even as the various
government programs noted above began to take shape, private interests
also began to mount genome research programs, some of them more
significant than publicly funded programs in their nations. In the U.S.,
the Howard Hughes Medical Institute focused on issues not drawing
sufficient attention from government, concentrating on databases and
helping support the initiation of the Human Genome Organization to
coordinate international efforts. In the U.K., the Imperial Cancer
Research Fund was an equal partner with the government Medical
Research Council early on, and the private Wellcome Trust made even
larger investments in new genome research and informatics centers in
1992 and 1993. In France, the most vigorous genome research effort
was supported by the Centre d'Etude du Polymorphism Humain
(CEPH), which formed a partnership with the private French Muscular
Dystrophy Association to establish the Genethon, a highly automated
genome research facility outside Paris. This effort was started quickly
and dwarfed the government genome research program. In Japan, the
Sagami Chemical Research Center and the Kazusa DNA Research
Institute pursued genome research under joint funding from their
respective prefectural governments, patent royalties, industrial funding
and other private support. Although these private funding sources did
have a diversity of commercial attachments, most were formed in the
tradition of nonprofit research institutes.
The international efforts were united in a desire to share map and
DNA sequence data widely. The idea behind gene maps was to use
them as tools to speed research and to reduce the need for multiple
laboratories throughout the world to develop maps of the same regions
when hunting for different genes. Maps would only be as useful insofar
as they were complete, and completeness depended on sharing data
freely and rapidly. CEPH was formed in 1984 to forge an international
collaboration for genetic linkage maps of human chromosomes. 37 The
37 Jean Dausset et al., Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme Humain (CEPH):
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groups searching for various genes also formed international
collaborations, intended to speed sharing of data and materials. This
international ethic of sharing, however, had to contend with a growing
set of commercial attachments that seemed likely to alter the rules
governing collaboration within and across national borders.
Commercial Pursuits
Beginning in 1992, a new wave of genome research centers began to
take shape, only these were not formed as nonprofit institutes, but were
startup companies supported by venture capital, public stock offerings,
or private corporate funds. Existing genome research centers also
developed ties to industry. In mid-1992, J. Craig Venter announced his
intention to form The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR). (His
work formed the basis for the patent application for expressed sequence
tags, which is discussed below.) This new nonprofit institute was then
the largest private investment, and its work was linked through
agreements on intellectual property rights to a larger for-profit unit,
Human Genome Sciences, Inc. Human Genome Sciences, Inc., in turn,
announced an agreement for $125 million ($59 million up front, the
rest contingent on achieving milestones) with Smith-Kline-Beecham in
May 1993, and William Haseltine was selected as Chief Executive
Officer. Another company, Incyte Pharmaceuticals, began a major
program in EST sequencing during 1992 and into 1993. Both Incyte
and Human Genome Sciences made initial public stock offerings in late
1993. Several private firms pursued instrumentation, including
Genomyx (a spinoff of Genentech), Applied Biosystems (by now
acquired by Perkin-Elmer) and others. Still others planned to locate
genes through mapping techniques, with an eye toward drug discovery:
Collaborative Research, Inc.; Mercator Pharmaceuticals; Millennium
Pharmaceuticals; Myriad Genetics; and Sequana Therapeutics. Darwin
Molecular Corp. was formed to exploit mapping and sequencing
techniques in combination with emerging techniques of directed
molecular evolution. The private for-profit investments considerably
Collaborative Genetic Mapping of the Human Genome, 6 Genomics 575 (1990).
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exceeded $100 million by the end of 1993, and this did not count
genome research strategies being pursued by large pharmaceutical and
other industrial firms.
These corporate funds were not attracted merely by hot science, but
also by the prospects of diagnostic applications and more expeditious
drug discovery. In every nation where the genome project was
presented to its government, including the USSR, promoters pointed to
the potential for genome research to create jobs and wealth through
new technology. The true potential for wealth, however, lay not in the
new technologies, but in applying them to practical uses. There would
doubtless be a spate of new instruments and reagents that could be
sold, but this would be a relatively small research market in comparison
to medical diagnostics and smaller still in comparison to therapeutic
pharmaceuticals, agriculture or environmental remediation.. In the
medical arena, the most compelling rationale for corporate investment
was not in technologies being pursued, but in the terrain being mapped,
that is, genes embedded in the human genome. Finding genes first
promised a lead in using them to target drug development, using the
genes themselves as therapeutic agents (gene therapy), controlling their
expression, using the gene products as protein therapeutics, or using the
protein products as targets to focus drug discovery by other means.
Private investments presumed a means to stake claims on that territory.
Those claims would necessarily change the complexion of research,
altering the rules by which materials and data were exchanged. The
claims being staked were in the form of patents or trade secrets.
Each national government had thus been encouraged a genome
research program not only to expedite biomedical research, but also to
promote national economic development. These goals could not both
be pursued to their logical ends without conflict, as national economic
development would by definition mean winning an international
economic competition, which was not entirely compatible with
unfettered international sharing of data, information and technology.
The seriousness of the conflict was brought to the surface by an
international controversy provoked by a U.S. patent application filed by
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NIH in June 1991. This application is discussed at greater length and
with greater authority elsewhere in this issue, but several points should
be made clear here. First, much of the public controversy was poorly
framed in ethical terms. Sanctimonious claims were made about direct
links between human genes and human dignity. DNA is a universal
genetic code, and it will be difficult if not impossible to distinguish
human genes from those derived from other organisms. This argument
cannot be taken too far, as it is obvious that the human genome in
aggregate contains the plans for a human instead of a monkey or
nematode or yeast, but it is equally clear that very few, if any, genes will
be exclusively human in origin. A classic 1975 paper by King and
Wilson showed that the average protein sequence between humans and
pygmy chimps differed by only 1% , and the difference at the DNA
level was only slightly greater.3 8 The obvious implication was that
humans differed more in the timing and quantity of gene expression,
than in genes as such.
It is far from clear what a proscription on patenting "human" genes
would entail, how it could be made meaningful in the law and whether
it would do any good. In most cases, patenting an animal gene and
then slightly modifying it for another patent would cover the same
material as a human gene. A simple genetic determinism would seem to
lie at the root of this equation of DNA with dignity. The factors that
distinguish humans from other organisms seem more likely to be
nuances of gene expression, development and environmental response
than the collection of genes in the human genome. The brain, for
example, is an organ seemingly adapted to be able to change its
structure and function in response to environmental stimuli, even more
than other organs. No CD-ROM containing Lincoln's DNA sequence
could tell us much we would care to know about why he became an
historically important figure.
The NIH patent dispute did surface a true international policy
dilemma nonetheless, but it was not in patenting policy per se but in
38 Mary-Claire King & Allan C. Wilson, Evolution at Two Levels in Humans and
Chimpanzees, 188 Science 107 (1975).
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conflicts between the goal of quickly constructing comprehensive maps
and databases as a worldwide scientific effort and the goal of linking
genome research to each nation's domestic economic development. It
was not a simple conflict with data-sharing, since investigators in each
company could release data as soon as patents were filed. Rather, it was
the incentive for each nation to structure its science effort so as to secure
its intellectual property rights before the others, just as each newly
formed genome research company within those countries had to beat
its competitors in order to have some intellectual property to protect.
Data could be shared only after stakes were claimed, and this could
theoretically provoke an international genome gold rush.
If one of the purposes of an international effort was to reduce the
duplication of effort that necessarily follows from a purely competitive
strategy, then this efficiency was at risk. Taken to an absurd extreme,
each nation might choose to apply for patents to partial sequences of all
human genes before making its data available to others. In this case, all
nations would have to map the entire genome. This is clearly not a real
threat, as filing patent applications frees investigators to publish
sequence data, and the process of finding even partial sequences of all
human genes will take years (but probably not decades). In theory,
however, every nation would be aiming at the same goal, expending its
resources to win the race, but only the winning efforts would secure the
intellectual property rights. This is a recipe for inefficiency, a true
multi-player prisoner's dilemma.
A final point about the NIH patent application is that the policy
dilemma was sure to surface. If NIH had not filed a multi-gene patent
application, private firms surely would have (and subsequently did).
The terms of the debate might have been different, and it might have
been long delayed and less conspicuous, as the patent application need
not have been publicly known for some time, but the debate was
nonetheless inevitable. Whether a quieter and later debate, or one with a
different cast of characters, might have been better or worse is a matter
about which we can surely speculate, but will never be certain.
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One of the most interesting aspects of technology transfer related
to the genome project is how the project is caught in changing rules. In
the long list of citations to technical origins of the human genome
project, some items have been patented and others not. To make this
point starkly, we can consider what might have been different if Sanger
or Maxam and Gilbert had patented the techniques for sequencing
DNA itself. These two main techniques were surely patentable but were
never patented. They are at least as central to research as the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR), discovered at Cetus Corp. in 1983 and sold (for
$300 million) to Hoffmann-La Roche in 1991. PCR was patented and
then controlled through a complex set of relatively high-fee licenses for
various applications and reagents. The Cohen-Boyer patent for
recombinant DNA was a centrally important technique of molecular
biology. It was patented, but then licensed for relatively low fees.
Laboratory instruments, such as DNA sequenators and DNA
synthesizers, were sold, with the price of the instrument and its reagents
covering patent fees. These disparate ways of handling research
methods and tools have clearly affected who could use them, perhaps
also the pace of discovery and its costs. Yet, how and to what degree are
matters for speculation and ideology more than empirical analysis.
It is far from clear what can explain differences in what was and was
not patented between the 1970's and the 1990's - aside from
historical happenstance and the changing norms of biomedical research.
It is evident that there is no analytical answer to: Is it good for science
to patent discoveries? Or, is it good for the nation to patent research
tools? Or even, is it good for technology transfer to patent discoveries?
Indeed, it is easy to conceive of different answers with different sets of
particulars. Analysis of factors that distinguish cases might well lead to
more sophisticated, and more successful, national policies and
international agreements governing intellectual property and the sharing
of data, materials and technologies.
Those grounded in norms of the pharmaceutical industry often take
the benefits of patenting as an article of faith - as well they might
because the entire industry rests on a foundation of patents. There is
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nonetheless a disturbing dearth of literature on the transaction costs of
patenting or the untoward effects on the research enterprise of complex
cross-licensing and constraints on sharing of data and materials -
especially in the domain of research tools. In contrast, those grounded
in the ethos of science take the benefits of free exchange as an article of
faith, but there is a dearth of data about therapeutic innovations that
may have been lost for lack of private investment.
Historically, patent law has proven to be a flexible, powerful engine
for innovation, but much debate about patent policy and technology
transfer takes place in the absence of empirical data about outcomes, let
alone analysis of long-term social impacts. The permissive interpretation
of biotechnology patent law of the 1980's, combined with a series of
"technology transfer" statutes and executive orders, make a volatile
mix. These trends moved policy strongly toward heavier reliance on
patents, but with little analysis of potential impact, on the pace of
discovery or international science. Where facts are sparse, ideology fills
the void. Even a cursory inspection of technology transfer policies
relating to genome research leads to one conclusion: All nations will be
better off if efforts are made to resolve difficult issues by resort to
carefully designed empirical research rather than contending ideologies.
